

# ARI – LIF

Kris och beredskap med  
reklamationer och  
indragningar i åtanke

Nov 5 2025



# Sweden: History In The Making

DAGENS  
**Medicin**

Resilience: the first line of defence

Sweden to lead next NATO  
headquarters in northern Finland





# News - National

## Staten köper antibiotikafabrik i Strängnäs – ska säkerställa tillgången vid kriser

UPPDATERAD 5 JUNI 2025 PUBLICERAD 5 JUNI 2025


Regeringen har beslutat att en antibiotikafabrik i Strängnäs ska köpas för att säkerställa tillgången på viktiga läkemedel i Sverige vid krissituationer.

Det meddelar socialminister Jakob Forssmed (KD) och ministern för civilt försvar, Carl-Oskar Bohlin (M), på en pressträff.



By 2028 there will be a five-fold increase (from 2023) towards funding to the civil defence sector equating to ca. 1.4b SEK per year – for prioritized areas

- Electronic Comms Services
- Postal Services
- Energy Supplies
- Transport
- Food & Drinking Water
- Healthcare & Welfare
- Rescue Services
- Civil Protection



## Resilience, civil preparedness and Article 3


- The principle of resilience is rooted in Article 3 of the [North Atlantic Treaty](#): “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”
- Article 3 helps to give NATO the means to fulfil its core tasks, particularly that of deterrence and defence.
- Resilience is both a national responsibility and a collective commitment. Each Ally needs to be sufficiently prepared and adaptable to deal with the entire spectrum of crises envisaged by the Alliance. At the same time, the individual commitment of every Ally to maintain and strengthen its resilience reduces the vulnerability of NATO as a whole.
- Military efforts to defend NATO territory and populations need to be complemented by robust civil preparedness to reduce potential vulnerabilities and the risk of attack in peacetime, crisis and conflict.
- Civil preparedness has three core functions: continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to military operations. These critical specifications have been translated into seven baseline requirements for national resilience against which Allies can measure their levels of preparedness.
- Military forces, especially those deployed during crises and conflict, depend heavily on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications, energy and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfil their missions. Effective civil preparedness ensures that these sectors are ready to withstand attacks or disruptions and can continue supporting NATO's military forces at all times.
- NATO's policy on resilience and civil preparedness is guided by the [Resilience Committee](#). It reports directly to the [North Atlantic Council](#), NATO's principal political decision-making body.



Luxembourg Armed Forces personnel set up a mobile medical facility at the Centre Hospitalier du Nord in Ettelbruck, Luxembourg during the COVID-19 pandemic, which tested the resilience of NATO countries.

1. Assured **continuity of government** and critical government services: for instance, the ability to make decisions and communicate with citizens in a crisis;
2. Resilient **energy supplies**: ensuring a continued supply of energy and having back-up plans to manage disruptions;
3. Ability to deal effectively with the **uncontrolled movement of people** and to de-conflict these movements from NATO's military deployments;
4. Resilient **food and water resources**: ensuring resilient supplies that are safe from disruption or sabotage;
5. Ability to deal with **mass casualties and disruptive health crises**: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure;
6. Resilient **civil communications systems**: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks can function even under crisis conditions, with sufficient back-up capacity. This also includes the need for reliable communications systems including 5G, robust options to restore these systems, priority access to national authorities in times of crisis, and the thorough assessments of all risks to communications systems;
7. Resilient **transport systems**: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis.

# Sveriges representation i Natos civila struktur





# Healthcare, Production Facilities and Logistics Are Key Targets Of Opportunity



Oct 2024

- 1581 attacks on Ukraine's health care system
- 800 damaged or destroyed hospitals
- 252 health workers killed

<https://www.attacksonhealthukraine.org/>

Mar 2024


- 426 attacks on large and medium-sized private enterprises
- \$11.4b of damages to industry
- 344 bridges and 25k KM of road destroyed
- \$36.6b of damages to infrastructure

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


# Threat Vectors During Times Of Conflict

**Threat vectors** are the means for an enemy to attack a victim via a numbers of different angles. The area that is being attacked is called the "**attack surface**" and the nature and complexity of that surface will determine the level of risk for a business and the opportunities for an attacker.



## 9 point business aspects to consider



## Aspects (x9) - Guidelines

- 1 - Government, Agency, Diplomacy
- 2 - HR, Legal, Compliance
- 3 - Communications & Training
- 4 - Security and Safety of Staff
- 5 - Asset Protection
- 6 - Supply Chain Resilience
- 7 - Financial Preparedness
- 8 - Reputation Management
- 9 - Humanitarian Considerations





## 1 – Government, Agency, Diplomacy

It is highly recommended that the private sector, which over the last 35 years has acquisitioned many areas that were originally part of the public sphere, engage with the public sector. This helps to develop trust and establish mutual objectives that are aligned to policy and legislation.

- Align on agencies to partner with
- Agree on expectations between agencies
- Confirm understanding on AZ position in society
- Understand political position & expectations

## 2 – HR, Legal, Compliance

Depending on the enterprise composition, size of the company and number of staff employed, it is recommended that the necessary internal functions are primed to managed potential changes in relation to becoming part of the civil defence program.

- Legal agreements and obligations to 3rd party entities
- Labour force rules and regulations
- Legal agreements with the state/commune



### 3 – **Communications & Training**

Concise communications coupled with proportionate trainings will enable enterprises to prepare according to possible escalations of crisis.

- Proportionate internal communication strategy
- Staggered training programs/e-learning
- Standard and back-up communication channels
- Aligned external communication protocols

### 4 – **Security and Safety of Staff**

Most enterprises will already have security and safety measures in place but an evaluation and upgrade program is recommended to ensure that measures and protocols reflect new types of potential threats.

- Upgrade civil defense shelters
- Ensure there is enough PPE
- Establish/check first aid stations
- Review/upgrade the evacuation protocol review
- Secure access/exit of sites/facilities



## 5 - Asset Protection

It's important to ensure that all aspects of the enterprise are protected – both at the physical and cyber level. Ensure that thorough reviews are conducted to determine if there are any gaps and where upgrades need to be implemented.

- Secure access/exit of sites/facilities
- Site vulnerabilities via physical/cyber channels
- Security partner's role/protocols on each site
- Any external dependancies (TPAs – Third Party Agreements)

## 6 – Supply Chain Resilience

Ensuring that the SCR is secure is critical in determining how an enterprise can continue to develop, manufacture and distribute its product. It is therefore recommended that SCR assessments are conducted with partners (and with the relevant authorities if necessary).

- Map current and alternative supply routes
- Confirm availability of supply partner(s)
- Secure agreements with port/air authorities
- Align on expectations with military/security entities
- Develop industry partnerships
- Explore contingency supply methods



## 7 – Financial Preparedness



The challenge to ensure that the connectivity between systems and platforms cannot be underestimated in relation to financial preparedness. Depending on the size and complexity of the enterprise, and the potential reliance on multiple third parties, it is imperative that payments to staff and third parties can continue during times of crisis.

- Understand potential financial impact e.g. trade restrictions
- Identify financial resilience capacity and insurance plans
- Determine capacity to diversify investments
- Assess if financial reserves available
- Confirming resilience of third parties

## 8 – Reputation Management

The way in which an enterprise conducts itself during a crisis is crucial to ensure that its trust and reliability is established. Depending on the size and composition of the enterprise, and its importance to society, it is important to have robust measures in place to communicate to the general public and to act upon the responsibilities bestowed upon that entity.

- Outline PR protocol management
- Adherence to corporate values
- Establish social responsibility efforts
- Deliver contributory plan to society



## 9 – Humanitarian Considerations

During a crisis it is important to contribute where possible back to society. Large and small enterprises can provide support at varying levels and can often make a big impact.

- Determine how the enterprise can provide community support e.g. distribution of PPE, hand sanitizer, establish first aid triage/stations etc.




# Wartime posting at a market company

- Which **roles** within the market company should be wartime posted?



- Identify which roles are critical within a market company.
  - E.g. Identified; RP, Logistics, Quality, CEO/Country President, Legal/Who can sign contracts, Medical Affairs? (*Note: Individuals cannot be wartime posted in other countries*).
- It's important to have a back-up/deputy for critical roles
- Map previous experiences to find a back-up, use HR for this





# Questions to consider



## Complaints and recalls in case of crisis

- **Handling complaints:**

- Can complaint samples be returned?
- Reporting channels?
- If there are few complaints, can trends for a batch be identified?

- **Product recall:**


- Approval of indragningsskrivelse?
- Will ARI develop an alternative process related to recalls?
- How to escalate indragningsskrivelse to pharmacies?

# Questions to consider



## Other topics

- e-VIS



# Questions to consider

## Other topics

- **Contact with the Medical Products Agency:**
  - How should supply shortages be handled?
  - Alternative reporting methods?
  - Increased risk of supply shortages?
- **BCP's:**
  - Do you have an updated version of the document?
  - Have you conducted an exercise with different scenarios?
- **Recommendations:**
  - Need to map which vendors the Marketing Company has agreement with
  - The National Board of Health and Welfare's (Socialstyrelsen) list of critical drugs
  - Understand the Swedish Armed Forces' (Försvarmakten) list of drugs



# Questions to consider

- Var rekommenderar du att man börjar nysta och vilka ska man konsultera (exempelvis rollen som marknadsbolag)?
- Beredskapslager: hur ska man tänka kring att sprida riskerna/inte lägga alla ägg i samma korg?
- Where do you recommend starting to untangle things, and who should be consulted (for example, the role of a marketing company)?
- Emergency stockpile: how should one think about spreading risks/not putting all eggs in one basket?



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## Q1

- Mindset: determine and accept if your company will be affected
- Assess and map your organization
- Determine who/what is of critical importance – adopt the plug & play method (e.g. AZ Ukraine)
- Engage with your global org (perhaps plan/best practice already available?)
- Engage with associations/authorities and start the collaborative dialogue
- Develop your plan with clear vision and goals based on your org's needs (e.g. re-visit your BCPs and update accordingly, and stress test)

## Q2

- Shift in concept “just in enough, just in time” to “just in case” –
- Requires one-time “bump-up” – initial costs offset by risk reduction
- Distributed stockpile – inherent risk (even in non-conflict/war situations) if only one location/facility available
- Note: proposal to government for legal obligations for x1 month's emergency stock of critical resources to be available across the country in all municipalities